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Abstract 
Contemporary psychology is once again at an inflection point with regard to its philosophical 
foundation. In this paper, we evaluate two prominent philosophies of science within the field of 
psychology—post-positivism and social constructionism—that are logically incompatible but 
often treated as equally valid by theorists, researchers, and practitioners. We discuss what each 
philosophy of science offers in terms of ontology, epistemology, and pragmatic justifications 
using the structure of a proposed argument, counterargument, and rebuttal. From this evaluation, 
we contend that post-positivism is a logically preferable philosophy of science for both the 
progress of collective knowledge and the sustainability of psychology as a science and therefore 
should guide future theory and research. We conclude by exploring implications for psychology 
including ways that social constructionist critiques can be employed to improve post-positivist 
approaches to psychology.  
 Keywords: psychology, post-positivism, social constructionism, philosophy of science, 
correspondence theory, coherence theory, pragmatism, epistemology, ontology 
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Imperfectly Known or Socially Constructed? What is Truth Again? 
How does one know if a claim is true? This question is at the heart of centuries of debate 
and discussion. Is truth an objective reality to be discovered? Or, is it a socially constructed 
conclusion? More specifically, is the scientific approach used in psychology a socially 
constructed value system? Or, are there principles, observations, and rational arguments dictating 
psychology’s systematic approach to science? This debate has become all the more salient with 
critiques in recent years questioning whether psychology should even be considered a science at 
all (Berezow, 2012: Jogalekar, 2013). 
This, of course, is not a new debate; it has played a central role throughout psychology’s 
history, and the answer has significant implications for the future of psychology (Feist & 
Gorman, 2013; Pilgrim, 2013). Theorists, researchers, and practitioners in the field must give 
sufficient consideration to the basis for their work and claims. As such, in this paper, we will 
argue for the merits of post-positivism and its utilization of the correspondence theory of truth, as 
opposed to its alternative, social constructionism and the postmodern thought that characterizes a 
dominant worldview in many cultures today (Inglehart, 1997). Ultimately, we will conclude that 
the tenets of post-positivism are logically preferable to social constructionism for the future of 
psychology. That is, there is an objective reality that can be known, albeit imperfectly, by relying 
on standards for empirically testing the validity of claims against observed data. Moreover, we 
suggest that social constructionism offers an internally inconsistent philosophy (i.e., the claim 
that “truth does not exist or cannot be known” is itself a truth claim). In contrast, it will be argued 
that a post-positivist approach allows for the accumulation of knowledge and the ability to 
predict future as yet undiscovered principles and relationships.  
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In the following sections, the terms necessary for presenting our argument will be 
defined. Subsequent sections will then present our arguments in three steps. First, the initial 
arguments in support of post-positivism and its use of correspondence theory will be presented. 
Second, a number of counterarguments both critiquing post-positivism and supporting social 
constructionism will be presented. Third, rebuttals to these counterarguments will be presented. 
Following these arguments, specific implications for how psychologists can maintain integrity to 
the principles of post-positivism while addressing critiques and concerns raised by social 
constructionists will be discussed. 
Philosophical Foundations 
 To begin, a clear definition of the differences between post-positivist and social 
constructionist philosophies must be established. Post-positivism in this paper is defined as the 
view that there is one reality, but that it is “only imperfectly and probabilistically 
apprehensible… [such that] findings are probably true” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 193). Social 
constructionism, contrastingly, is a relativist position characterized by rejecting that “either 
reality or validity are absolutist…; rather, they are derived from community consensus regarding 
what is ‘real,’ what is useful, and what has meaning” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 197; Schwandt, 
2000). The two philosophies primarily differ with regard to epistemology (i.e., the study of 
knowledge) and ontology (i.e., the study of reality). Specifically, the two paradigms take 
alternative stances on how to define reality and the extent to which humanity is capable of 
knowing reality (Ponterotto, 2005).  
Positivists and post-positivists approach psychology as an empirical science where truth 
can be discovered, whereas social constructionists approach psychology from a 
phenomenological or postmodern perspective where truth does not exist absolutely, but can only 
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be understood as social construction local to a specific context (Feist & Gorman, 2013; Gergen, 
2001). To elaborate, the post-positivist approach accepts the ability of each individual to know 
(albeit imperfectly) the world via observations and subsequently convey this knowledge through 
the use of language; social constructionists, however, would argue that the language itself is 
socially constructed and, therefore, it bears the real truth or meaning for any given claim 
(Hansen, 2004). 
Historical Roots 
Psychology as a science has its philosophical roots in the modernist perspective of 
positivism (Çakir, 2012). Considered to be a perspective that came to (and some say still does) 
dominate scientific pursuits (Guo, 2015; Hunt, 1994; Ponterotto, 2005), this paradigm posits that 
the truth of a claim relies on the claim being either logical or verifiable through an empirical 
method (Cacioppo, Semin, & Berntson, 2004; Meyers, 1975). In other words, claims must either 
hold up logically or be verified with empirical data, and one’s observations of the world can be 
valid, objective conclusions (Alevesson & Sköldberg, 2010; Hansen, 2004). That is, the values, 
biases, culture, experiences, language, and all nonobjective aspects of the researcher should bear 
as little influence as possible on the collection of data and the post hoc formulation of theory. 
Collected data can be relied upon as objective representations of reality such that values and 
human fallibility are minimized. Thus, for the positivist, there is an objective and knowable truth 
that can be verified via either logical or empirical demonstrations, both of which serve as 
objective ways of knowing reality (Ponterotto, 2005). 
 The perspective of positivism, however, would subsequently endure two distinctions that 
gave birth to the philosophy of post-positivism (Ponterotto, 2005). First, whereas the positivist 
emphasizes the verification of claims as the way to demonstrate truth, the post-positivist 
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perspective places greater emphasis on the notion of falsifiability in demonstrating truth (Çakir, 
2012; Ponterotto, 2005). To elaborate, according to Popper (1959), a claim can only be 
scientifically meaningful if there is an observation that could possibly make it false. For 
example, the claim that “all doves are white” can be easily falsified by simply providing one 
nonwhite dove. A non-falsifiable claim, however, is one for which there exists no possible 
observation that could make it false. For example, the claim that an omnipotent, omnipresent, 
and omniscient God exists is a non-falsifiable claim because there is no possible observation that 
prevents such a deity from possibly existing. By definition, it could never be shown as false. 
Thus, according to Popper (1959), in order for a claim to bear any scientific meaning, it must be 
able to be falsified, and claims that cannot be falsified have no meaningful place in science. 
The second aspect of positivism that was eventually called into question is the belief that 
human beings are capable of objective knowledge (Ponterotto, 2005). Specifically, Kuhn (1970) 
suggests that science occurs in a paradigm or worldview that influences which research questions 
are asked, how the data is interpreted, and what conclusions are drawn. In The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, he asserts that “the existence of the paradigm sets the problem to be 
solved… [and] is implicated directly in the design of apparatus able to solve the problem” (p. 
27). Embracing and building on this perspective, Gergen (1973) argued that psychological 
findings and theories throughout history ultimately reflect the latent values of society and 
culture. These critiques and concerns paved the way for a polar contrast to both positivism and 
post-positivism: postmodernism. 
 One of the central tenets of postmodernism is a denial of objectivity in human knowledge 
(Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Postmodernists claim that all human knowledge is influenced by a 
number of factors specific to the individual and his or her community (e.g., values, biases, 
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culture, language, etc.). Thus, all knowledge is ultimately “a byproduct of communal 
construction,” and therefore lacking in objectivity (Alevesson & Sköldberg, 2010; Gergen, 2001, 
p. 806). Within this view, and most relevant to this paper, is the philosophy of science known as 
social constructionism, which follows the postmodernist belief of human knowledge being 
nonobjective and communally constructed (Hansen, 2004). 
 From this perspective, there is no justification for believing in an apprehensible, objective 
reality because there is no possible way to objectively and empirically know whether or not this 
reality exists (Schwandt, 2000)—or to objectively and empirically know anything! Thus, social 
constructionists would conclude that there is not one objective reality, but rather several equally 
valid realities (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Ponterotto, 2005). To better understand this perspective, 
consider the idea that, if everyone is special, then by definition no one is special. The same 
thought process underlies social constructionism. If every belief is nonobjective, then by 
definition no belief is nonobjective, meaning that all beliefs are equal insofar as they all bear 
equal degrees of objectivity; they represent equally valid realities. 
Many have discussed the possible deleterious consequences on scientific progress, human 
knowledge, and societal institutions if the scientific community were to embrace a philosophy 
that “jettison[s] the idea of aiming at ‘the truth’” (Haig & Borsboom, 2012, p. 273; Locke, 2002). 
Nevertheless, social constructionism begins with a compelling premise: no human is truly 
objective, regardless of the tendency to believe otherwise (Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004). 
However, this begs several questions. Is there an alternative way to acknowledge the 
imperfection of human knowledge without moving to a logical extreme of several equally valid 
(and thus equally invalid) realities? Moreover, can this be done while still remaining accountable 
to empirical standards for science? For the post-positivist, the answer is yes. According to the 
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post-positivist, social constructionism is not the only solution to the concern over a lack of 
objectivity in human knowledge. Rather, post-positivism is a somewhat modified form of 
positivism that embraces the two distinctions of (1) an emphasis on falsifiability and (2) a 
humble acknowledgment of human fallibility (Ponterotto, 2005). 
 In many ways, social constructionism and post-positivism share a common ground in the 
way that each philosophy denies the positivist’s belief in the objectivity of human knowledge 
(Jost & Kruglanski, 2002). Yet, from there, social constructionists go on to conclude that no 
objective truth exists (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). In contrast, post-positivists conclude that an 
objective reality does exist but human’s understanding of it will always be imperfect. 
Correspondence Theory 
If post-positivists say that there is an external, objective reality that can only partially be 
known, the challenge becomes establishing a theoretical framework that allows one to assess the 
extent to which claims match this external reality. This is the correspondence theory of truth. 
From this perspective, a claim is valid insofar as it corresponds to observations of the world 
(Haig & Borsboom, 2012; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Thus, there must be standards and 
procedures for establishing the validity of these observations (Jost & Kruglanski, 2002). For the 
post-positivist, this theory of truth is crucial because it becomes the maxim by which one could 
theoretically come to know, albeit imperfectly, objective reality. In other words, the post-
positivist’s goal of knowing truth relies on a belief that the truth can be found in that which 
corresponds to observations of the world.  
This establishes the framework for the boundaries of the current debate. However, it 
doesn’t capture the depth of arguments and counter-arguments that can be raised by adherents of 
social constructionism and post-positivism. The following section will include several of these 
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arguments, counterarguments, and rebuttals to evaluate the assertion that post-positivism and its 
reliance on correspondence theory brings one closer to objective truth than social 
constructionism. 
The Convictions of a Post-Positivist 
 To begin, a series of claims will argue that psychology is best served when built on a 
post-positivist foundation. Three of the central arguments are presented below that reflect the 
ontology, epistemology, and pragmatic justifications for the post-positivist position. 
Argument #1: There is an Objective Truth, Regardless of Us Knowing It 
 When deconstructing the post-positivist perspective, there is an ontological claim being 
made that there is an objective reality (Hansen, 2004). Of course, to the social constructionist and 
most postmodernists, this assumption is just that—an assumption. In contrast, social 
constructionists would posit that nothing is objective because all knowledge is filtered through a 
subjective lens (Gergen, 2001; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). However, even if it is only an 
assumption, and even if all are truths are imperfect because they are filtered through a subjective 
lens, the post-positivist assumption that an objective truth exists may hold as a logically valid 
argument, albeit an a priori one. To elaborate, first consider the social constructionist argument: 
all truth and knowledge is filtered through language, culture, biases, etc.; therefore, there is no 
justification for concluding that an objective truth exists. Yet, even if reality is filtered through 
the lens of a human mind, this would imply that reality was objective prior to the filter, meaning 
that there is an objective reality in existence. Perhaps then, it is ill-advised to abandon belief in 
an objective reality simply because the interpretation and expression of it is subjective. Locke 
(2002) articulates this point with much zest: 
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“The objective pursuit of knowledge is to be replaced by ‘language games’… because, 
the postmodernists claim, language is not a reflection of one’s inner ideas about the world 
but something that itself constructs reality. How language gets this magical power is 
never discussed” (Locke, 2002, p. 458). 
The post-positivist argues that, even with the subjectivity of human interpretation, one 
can still conclude that some form of objective reality exists prior to its interpretation. The next 
concern, then, is how one mitigates the imperfection of this interpretive process. 
Argument #2: Imperfect Knowledge is not Constructed Knowledge 
For the social constructionist, the biases that make objective knowledge impossible 
(Ackerman et al., 2006; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992; Robins et al., 1996) provide support for the 
idea that all claims should be considered as equally imperfect and, therefore, equally valid 
(Gergen, 2001). In other words, imperfect knowledge essentially equates to constructed, equally 
valid knowledge. On the other hand, post-positivists argue that, even if human knowledge falls 
short of perfect objectivity, there are criteria for belief that can be used to test whether some 
claims correspond to reality more so than others (Haig & Borsboom, 2012). These criteria allow 
for comparisons between claims so as to assess the degree of imperfection in the claim. In other 
words, human observations and scientific pursuits being imperfect does not mean that all claims 
are therefore constructed and equally valid. Rather, the correspondence theory of truth allows 
one to assess the degree to which a given claim corresponds to observations of the world, thereby 
demonstrating an amount of validity that may be more or less than that of other claims.  
Whereas post-positivism relies on this criteria of correspondence, postmodern thought 
and other constructionist perspectives are largely driven by either relativist or relative pragmatic 
conceptions of truth, meaning that truth is not absolute but rather unique to the context and needs 
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of each individual (Schmitt, 1995). Specifically, relativism denies the existence of objective 
truths, and pragmatism bases the truth of a claim on the degree to which it is useful to believe in 
said claim, regardless of whether or not it matches empirical observations. By claiming 
correspondence theory as the optimal theory of truth, however, post-positivists utilize systematic 
observations of the world as the basis for assessing the validity of claims, allowing one to 
differentiate the levels of imperfection between claims.  
Argument #3: Post-Positivism Helps the Constructionist, Psychology, and Society at Large 
 So long as there is a silver lining to a given perspective, there is a pragmatic argument to 
be exploited. Here, three specific pragmatic benefits of post-positivism will be discussed. First, 
the benefit of post-positivism for the social constructionist is the ability of this approach to 
resolve concerns over oppressed voices. To elaborate, social constructionists often argue that 
feminist, racial minority, Marxist, and other non-majority voices are commonly suppressed, 
ignored, or actively censored within a post-positivist model (Gergen, 2001). Yet, while these 
individuals typically go on to espouse the equality of these voices, they fail to offer any 
normative guidance for identifying the predictable, systemic influences that repress minority 
voices, nor do they provide evidence of the effectiveness of strategies for ensuring their 
inclusion. In fact, under a constructionist worldview, these research-based recommendations 
could only be considered as local, ideographic perspectives. Contrastingly, the empirical 
processes in post-positivism allow one to study, understand, and accurately predict the systematic 
biases within a group or culture (Hogg, 2010), the effectiveness of interventions to correct such 
biases (Crano & Seyranian, 2009), and the biases within the observers themselves (Robins, 
Spranca, & Mendelsohn, 1996). 
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A second benefit of post-positivism extends to psychology as a whole. Specifically, the 
continuous pursuit of truth from a post-positivist perspective enables one to generate working 
models and theories of phenomena that can subsequently be tested. These models of the world 
can be amended and abridged over time to more adequately represent the collective observations 
of the world. Moreover, these models can also be used to apply scientific findings to practical 
settings, creating avenues for future research and evaluation. Going back to the example of non-
majority voices, a post-positivist approach would allow for robust and generalizable models to 
address the questions of which voices are ignored; which processes promote certain voices over 
others; and which process effectively establish egalitarian social systems? Overall, the ultimate 
trend of this process is the progress of knowledge as opposed to the constructionist trend that 
may inadvertently promote stagnation by way of accepting anything as valid; this stagnation 
represents “the dead end of philosophy” that Locke (2002, p. 458) and others (e.g., Sokal & 
Bricmont, 1999) claim is the ultimate conclusion of postmodernism. 
One final benefit of post-positivism is its implication for society at large. Specifically, 
there may be potential deleterious effects of social constructionism on the pursuit of establishing 
a moral or good society. For example, Locke (2002) notes that the logical end of social 
constructionism is that no claim is more or less true than another, meaning that all claims are 
equal. Within this view, there is no meaningful difference between what many consider to be 
morally right and wrong; morality is unique to the individual. Thus, there would be no moral 
justification for penalizing, punishing, or even personally judging the behaviors of criminals, 
terrorists, etc. (Talbott, 2005). If taken seriously, the implication of such a conclusion is the 
abandonment of the pursuit of a good society as all societies, regardless of whether they value 
equality, justice, peace, etc., would be considered equal. Post-positivism, on the other hand, 
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allows for the study and rational conversation of morality and good societies at a level beyond 
relativism. In this paradigm, universal or logically derived ethical maxims can be promoted as a 
standard for assessing the goodness of a society, which can self-correct with time as knowledge 
accumulates (Talbott, 2005). 
Critiques to an Overly-Convicted Perspective 
Nevertheless, for each of the aforementioned arguments regarding ontology, 
epistemology, and pragmatic justifications, there are a number of compelling counterarguments. 
Counterargument #1: Where is the Observed Proof of External, Objective Reality? 
 In regards to the ontological argument that an objective reality exists via one’s 
perceptions, one noteworthy counterargument comes from Descartes (1641/1993). Tailoring 
Descartes’s (1641/1993) argument to this conversation, even if post-positivists accept the 
imperfection of human knowledge, they still assume that one’s observations reflect something 
external to the human mind. In other words, there is an assumption that everything perceived is 
external prior to its perception and interpretation. However, as Descartes (1641/1993) suggested 
in his Meditations on First Philosophy, such an assumption would be ill-advised because there 
are times when one’s senses can be deceitful, as is the case with any optical illusion. This 
argument can be extended even further to the thought experiment that life could simply be a 
realistic dream; one’s mind could be connected to an advanced simulation or matrix machine; or 
one could have been drugged with something so potent that all perceptions are successfully 
deceiving. Overall, it is entirely possible that one’s senses are always deceitful, thereby 
preventing one from ever fully believing in objective reality. 
Furthermore, it would be hypocritical for a post-positivist to believe in the existence of a 
purely objective reality because this claim is not empirically testable. To elaborate, even though 
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empirical post-positivists acknowledge the fallibility of human knowledge, they nonetheless 
conclude that there is still objective reality that can be known imperfectly through empirical 
methods (Ponterotto, 2005). Yet, the social constructionist would argue that these empirical 
methods cannot demonstrate the superiority of one philosophical claim about reality over another 
because there is no way to empirically test reality in a non-objective manner. Moreover, these 
empirical methods cannot truly demonstrate the objectivity of any claim considering that any 
empirical test of said claim would be interpreted by a non-objective human. Thus, the argument 
that an objective reality exists is not a testable claim, essentially making it a faith-based belief 
that is no more or less valid than any other perspective.  
Counterargument #2: Imperfect is Functionally Equivalent to Constructed 
 The inability to empirically demonstrate objectivity poses a considerable flaw to the 
epistemological position of post-positivism in that it prevents one from making assessments of 
the amount of objectivity that a given claim may have. In other words, if a claim is based on 
imperfect knowledge, how is one to say that the claim is only mildly imperfect as opposed to 
being 100% imperfect (i.e., not true at all)? Likewise, how can one say that one imperfect claim 
is more or less true than another imperfect claim? Some may retort that the tactic for evading this 
critique is to rely on a consensus amongst the claims of several observers or experts so as to 
demonstrate the notion of interrater reliability (Shadish et al., 2002). 
However, even if there are multiple people making observations, how can one know the 
objectivity of the consensus taken from the group? The conclusion of a group, even with high 
interrater reliability, does not necessarily demonstrate objectivity or validity, but rather simply 
agreement between several imperfect claims. Consider, for example, some of the more infamous 
instances of a consensus or agreement amongst experts that resulted in events or decisions that 
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many would now consider to be invalid in a number of ways (e.g., consensus amongst experts in 
Nazi Germany that the Jewish population was biologically inferior, and belief in U.S. culture for 
many years that African Americans and women did not deserve the same rights as white males). 
Consensus, which is the mark of high interrater reliability, does not necessarily suggest inherent 
rightness, validity, or truth. Thus, the objectivity of a claim may still be unattainable even with 
high interrater reliability, thereby posing the concern that the objectivity of all claims may be 
unattainable and, for all functional purposes, equal. 
Counterargument #3: Pragmatic Arguments Go Both Ways 
 There are several potentially harmful consequences of post-positivism. Gergen (2001) 
presents a helpful discussion illustrating these consequences. First, if one accepts that all science 
is approached from certain established paradigms (Kuhn, 1970), as both the empirical post-
positivist and social constructionist do (Jost & Kruglanski, 2002), then “the individual scientist is 
deemed rational only if he or she adopts the codes of discourse common to his or her particular 
community of science” (Gergen, 2001, p. 805). Thus, the post-positivist accepts validity in a 
claim only if it endures the standards and protocols that have been established in that community. 
This presents several harmful consequences because this system essentially oppresses and 
marginalizes groups who are not represented well in the community establishing these rigorous 
standards. This results in unheard voices from those who have not historically been represented 
in scientific communities—more often than not, those who do not fit the Caucasian, male 
stereotype. These critiques can be found elsewhere as well (see Eagly & Riger [2014] for a 
review of feminist critiques of positivism). 
Moreover, one could extend the pragmatic argument against post-positivism even further 
to say that the strict adherence to previously constructed standards might have harmful 
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consequences in regards to research and publishing. To elaborate, too strict of scientific norms 
and values may contribute to a bias against replication studies (Neuliep & Crandall, 1990, 1993); 
a bias against publishing negative (i.e., non-significant) results, thereby increasing the risk of 
type I error in knowledge (Cortina & Folger, 1998; Greenwald 1975); and the pressure that these 
biases place on researchers to commit questionable research practices (QRPs; John, 
Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; Stroebe, Postmes, & Spears, 2012). 
The Post-Positivist Rebuttal 
The criticisms of post-positivism are compelling. The temptation is to land somewhere in 
the middle (e.g., sometimes psychology should use a post-positivist approach, sometimes a social 
constructionist approach). The problem, of course, is that the two philosophical paradigms are 
logically incompatible, especially when focusing on ontology and epistemology. Either there is 
an objective reality that we can imperfectly know or there is not. This, of course, is not a 
problem for the social constructionist who believes that contradictory claims can coexist, so long 
as the claims are not generalizable beyond the specific context at hand. However, a hypocrisy of 
this perspective emerges when the social constructionist relies on research that a certain cancer 
treatment will be more effective than another; on the aerodynamics of airplane flight; or that 
certain practices are more effective at reducing the spread of HIV/AIDs than others. Each of 
these examples rely on research aimed at providing robust, generalizable claims based on the 
existence of an objective reality. As most post-positivists and social constructionists alike 
commonly rely on this research every day, further deliberation about ontology, epistemology, 
and pragmatic justifications is warranted. With this in mind, the following sections will consider 
the post-positivists’ rebuttals to each of the aforementioned counterarguments. 
 
IMPERFECTLY KNOWN OR SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED? 17 
Rebuttal #1: Cogito Ergo Sum—an Age-Old Justification for Objective Reality 
 As noted previously, Descartes’s (1641/1993) arguments suggest that one’s senses are not 
a trustworthy representation of an external, objective reality because they could always be 
wrong. Taken to its logical extreme, this can lead one to believe that there is no justifiable reason 
to believe in an external, objective reality at all. However, the issue with Descartes’s (1641/1993) 
claim is that it is not falsifiable; there is no way for anyone to disprove it. Consider a similar 
example: there is no way to empirically measure and disprove the existence of God, but that is 
hardly a decent reason to believe in God’s existence. Likewise, there is no way to empirically 
measure and disprove that one’s senses are not always deceitful, but this is hardly a decent 
argument for no longer trusting one’s senses. Moreover, untrustworthy senses do not ipso facto 
prove that everything is thereby relative and that objective reality does not exist. In fact, the so-
called “hard sciences” would suggest just the opposite. Objective reality is true whether people 
believe it or not; it is independent of social consensus at any given point in time (Sokal & 
Bricmont, 1999).  
Additionally, Descartes (1647/1983) would later suggest that even if one cannot disprove 
sense deception arguments, one can still logically deduce that something objectively true has to 
exist. His well-known conclusion of this argument, cogito ergo sum, translates to the sentiment 
of, “I think, therefore, I am.” This adage suggests that something objective has to exist because, 
without it, one would not be capable of thinking in the first place. To elaborate, even if one’s 
senses are deceiving, he or she can at least conclude that the senses exist; even if everything one 
observes is occurring within his or her head, it can at least be concluded that the head exists; 
even if one’s mind is connected to a simulation machine, one can at least conclude that the 
simulation machine exists; even if one is experiencing an extremely lucid drug effect, one can at 
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least conclude that the drug exists; and so on and so forth. Thus, the mere state of one thinking is 
enough proof of the objective existence of at least one thing, even if one’s interpretation of it is 
imperfect.  
Rebuttal #2: Imperfection can be Mitigated, but There is No Limit to Constructed Truths 
 With regard to epistemology, post-positivism acknowledges that the scientific process is 
not without limits or values. However, the post-positivist has adopted practices and criteria via 
correspondence theory that are self-reflexive and self-correcting. That is, the standards that post-
positivists embrace (e.g., that one’s predictions must correspond to observations in a reliable 
manner) can mitigate the imperfection of claims. Moreover, in a post-positivist research 
paradigm, these claims can be falsified through empirical testing (Popper, 1959). Predictions can 
be made and then tested to determine if the results are consistent. In contrast, in social 
constructionism—a perspective in which all truths are equal—there is no method for falsifying 
claims because all claims are unique to the individual, meaning that there is no limit to what can 
be true. All predictions and all outcomes are equally valid because there is no standard to 
determine what is or is not correct. Thus, while values influence the pursuit of truth in any 
philosophy of science, an imperfect truth garnered from post-positivist research bears more 
“trueness” than a socially constructed truth because it is both falsifiable and pursued using 
rigorous standards for mitigating imperfection. For post-positivists, standards dictate whether 
claims are true; for social constructionists, anything and everything can be equally true. 
The standards and norms that are valued in post-positivist science aim to ensure good 
scientific practices and valid conclusions through testing the extent to which proposed ideas and 
theories match observations of reality (Anderson, Ronning, DeVries, & Martinson, 2010; 
Shadish et al., 2002). For example, multiple raters may serve to increase reliability; using mixed 
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methods can help to move beyond individual perceptions to demonstrate discriminant and 
convergent validity (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Descombe, 2008); and systematic replication by 
altering operationalizations or methods may yield increasingly robust, consistent findings 
(Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, & Gonzales, 1990; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 
2003; Shadish et al., 2002). 
These practices provide the post-positivist with a metric to assess the validity of claims, 
something that the social constructionist can only measure as agreement or non-agreement with 
others. Overall then, post-positivists would rebut the social constructionist argument that no 
scientific pursuit is without constructed standards by arguing that the process of predicting 
outcomes and observing results across a wide variety of situations over time drives objectivity, 
accountability, and transferability of knowledge in comparison to philosophy that accepts 
everything as relative.  
Rebuttal #3: The Futility of Utility 
 The post-positivist acknowledges the pragmatic concerns of social constructionism, but 
attempts to resolve them by maintaining a pursuit of truth. Specifically, if certain minority voices 
are underrepresented in empirical research, instead of abandoning truth altogether, a post-
positivist solution would be to find empirically, predictable ways to raise awareness by making a 
proactive effort to be more inclusive of underrepresented voices in research; or perhaps increase 
societal emphasis and encouragement of minority participation in the sciences; or perhaps 
expand post-positivist research agendas into areas that are often not represented. Thus, post-
positivists might argue that pursuing objective truth from a post-positive philosophy of science 
may help to resolve some of the concerns with unheard voices in post-positive science. Similarly, 
post-positivism provides several ways to assess potential biases in the publication and research 
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process, offering solutions to the concerns raised in ways that do not require the complete 
abandonment of objective truth (see Fuchs, Jenny, & Fiedler, 2012; Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012; 
Nosek & Lakens, 2014).  
Overall, the crux of this rebuttal is that potential harmful consequences of post-positivism 
do not merit the abandonment of the pursuit of objective truth. Rather, adjustments to the post-
positivist system can be integrated so as to bring the scientific community closer to this objective 
truth. By this point, the core differences between post-positivism and social constructionism have 
been discussed at length. Yet, how do psychologists genuinely practice this philosophy in 
research pursuits? In the following section, a number of recommendations for doing just that will 
be discussed. 
Walking the Talk: Practical Implications for Psychologists 
Unfortunately, many psychologists who adopt a post-positivist perspective have not 
critically examined the philosophical foundation of their beliefs. That is, they have not carefully 
evaluated their own biases or the socially constructed values that have been adopted in science. 
They have not considered the effects of the sub-culture that they inhabit on their perceptions of 
what is and what is not true. Thus, many post-positivists ironically rely on a consensus theory of 
truth for their beliefs and the theories to which they ascribe (e.g. because everyone else in the 
discipline believes it is true) without critically evaluating whether or not those theories are 
simply socially constructed or rather based on a correspondence theory of truth. 
 Of course, there may be no way to approach science without the presence of at least some 
social construction or constructed values. However, self-examination and self-correction is 
possible so as to prevent “less than objective” from becoming “purely subjective.” Gorsuch 
(1998) describes this point well when he says, “The purpose of psychological science is to 
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increase objectivity. This occurs when each psychologist attempts to establish clear decision 
rules for conclusions before data are collected, and tests theories by those decision rules” (p. 
219). As such, several implications are important to consider moving forward. We review four in 
particular: taking the “post” in post-positivism more seriously; exploring normative rules that 
govern emergent, dynamic phenomena; publishing each piece of the puzzle; and engaging in 
philosophical debates about underlying values guiding psychology. 
Taking the “Post-” in Post-Positivism More Seriously 
Post-positivism holds that all human knowledge is, at best, imperfect, but this sentiment 
can be taken much more seriously with regard to subjectivity, the influence of the researcher, and 
the role of common method variance. In regards to subjectivity, post-positivist research might 
become more transparent about subjectivity by drawing on phenomenological methodologies 
that explicitly acknowledge and manage it. This might entail conversations about the power 
dynamics in a study, problems/solutions in variable measurement, or adaptations that occur in 
the study over time (Anastas, 2004; Fuchs et al., 2012; Gioia, Corley, Hamilton, 2012; Gringeri, 
Barusch, & Cambron, 2013). Furthermore, inductive, qualitative research within a post-positivist 
framework becomes a powerful way to generate future hypotheses to be explored.  
In regards to the influence of the researcher, post-positivists can be more aware of their 
underlying assumptions, values, and perspectives by considering why they are interested in a 
given research topic as well as the values that they hold during the research process (Myers & 
Jeeves, 2003). In other fields, scholars are sometimes even asked to go so far as to explicitly call 
out their perspective at the outset of study (e.g., Croy, 2011). For psychologists, there should at 
least be some consideration of the relevant demographic characteristics, paradigmatic beliefs, 
and life events that may have influenced various aspects of the pursuit of truth. 
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Finally, post-positivists must also be aware of and manage common method variance, 
which occurs when different constructs are assessed using the same method (e.g., a cross-
sectional survey), making them no longer orthogonal which can alter the size and direction of an 
observed effect (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Advanced methods for statistically controlling for this 
bias may be a significant challenge for scholars given the pressures on academics to successfully 
publish manuscripts (Alvarez, Bonnet, & Kahn, 2014; Crane & Pearson, 2011; Miller, Taylor, & 
Bedeian, 2011). Nonetheless, there are thoughtful approaches to mitigating the threat. 
Specifically, one can use different sources for predictor/outcome variables, separate these 
variables temporally, or control for common method variance statistically as a latent variable 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). In addition to each of these tactics, there is also room for development 
in the ways that post-positivists conduct research, as will be discussed below. 
Exploring Normative Rules that Govern Dynamic, Emergent Phenomena 
 The adoption of social constructionism can be a reaction against the places where post-
positivism currently struggles—in describing and predicting processes in dynamic, complex, 
interdependent environments where simple cause-effect relationships do not adequately describe 
the dynamics at play. This might be the case when a relationship between two constructs is 
affected by a higher level of analysis; when constructs have positive or negative feedback loops 
that dynamically change over time; or when the observer (e.g., the scientist) is embedded within 
the system. Relativism within a social constructionist paradigm has often been proposed as the 
alternative solution, noting that every observation depends on so many factors that every 
phenomenon should be considered unique and non-generalizable.  
Is there another option? Theory and research in post-formal thinking suggests that there is 
and that the next developmental step may be to look for normative rules that govern dynamic, 
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interdependent, emergent processes (Basseches, 1984; Kitchener & Brenner, 1990). Four post-
formal phenomena are often noted: whole-part relationships, time, dynamic interdependent 
relationships, and observer-phenomena interactions. Studying these phenomena through a post-
positivist lens doesn’t lead to relativism, but rather the identification of predictive, normative 
processes in dynamic, emergent systems. For example, an engineer building a bridge considers 
how each structural part relates to the whole, how they work together, how key variables can 
change over time, how they interact with the larger environment, and how the engineer can 
manage his or her own biases. The engineer does not conclude that there is no correct way to 
build a bridge because it depends on so many underlying factors, but rather looks for higher 
order principles and how they interact with one another and change over time.  
Forays into the normative rules that govern dynamic systems are emerging. In the arena 
of part-whole relationships, micro-, macro-, and meso-levels can play out in predictable ways 
within each level or can combine at lower levels to create emergent processes at higher level 
processes (Klein & Kozlowski, 2000). Moreover, normative processes have been identified in 
groups, such as through the ways that minority voices are suppressed and the predictive ways 
that they can influence the majority (Hogg, 2010). Within organizations, microfoundations (i.e., 
individual behavioral routines; Teece, 2007) have been found to combine to influence the larger 
organizational culture. For example, the proactive seeking and management of errors at the 
individual level (Keith & Frese, 2008) can combine at the organizational level to form adaptive, 
learning organizations predictive of subsequent organizational performance (Van Dyck, Frese, 
Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005). Similarly, Walton (2014) notes several psychological interventions 
that serve as seemingly small catalysts that produce significant long-term behavior change.  
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Several methods exist to study the patterns of change over time (Ployhart & Vandenberg, 
2010) and various patterns of change within large systems (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011). Combined, 
the impact of these advancements relies on a successful system for publishing and disseminating 
research, as discussed below. 
Publishing Each Piece of the Puzzle 
One of the benefits of post-positivism for scientific progress is that its use of standards 
and criteria for validity allows one to assess the robustness of findings, thereby enabling the 
creation of self-correcting, working models that are based on a wealth of diverse research. In this 
way, every scientific finding in a post-positivist research paradigm acts as one piece of the 
puzzle of reality. However, critical pieces of this puzzle are lost when both null findings and 
controversial conclusions go unpublished. In regards to null findings, academic journals tend to 
reject research that does not demonstrate a p value below the traditional cutoff of .05 (Cortina & 
Folger, 1998; Nosek & Lakens, 2014; Nosek. Spies, & Motyl, 2012), which bloats collective 
confidence in claims and prevents an understanding of relationships or differences that are 
unfounded. To overcome this, researchers can pursue journals that offer provisional acceptance 
(i.e., acceptance based on design and justification of a study prior to data collection). Some 
examples of these journals are Perspectives on Psychological Science 
(http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/replication) and The Journal of Business 
Psychology (Landis, Cortina, & Rogelberg, n.d.), among others. 
In regards to publishing controversial conclusions, psychology operates in a world where 
the majority of studies published confirm the hypotheses (Bones, 2012). In addition to lacking 
null finding publications, this also suggests a bias in the topics that researchers choose to study. 
In other words, post-positivist researchers need to seriously reconsider whether or not they are 
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willing to be wrong in their convictions. That is, they need to be more genuine in considering the 
extent to which they pursue and publish personally discomforting research that may not align 
with their values. In the same vein, one last suggestion for post-positivist researchers pertains to 
the cultivation and establishment of such values, as discussed below.  
Engaging Philosophical Debates about Underlying Values that Guide Psychology  
More debate is needed in psychology to examine the values that drive theory, research, 
and practice. This is a philosophical issue that requires logic and reasoning to resolve. For 
example, is there a reasoned, logical philosophical foundation for the APA’s ethical guidelines, 
or are they simply socially constructed? If the latter is the case, then recent ethics violations 
regarding complicit behavior related to torture (Risen & Apuzzo, 2014) cannot be condemned 
because one can argue that the acts were simply based on alternative and equally valid socially 
constructed value systems.  
To this end, significantly more philosophical and theoretical attention needs to focus on 
defining “the good society” and how psychology can help build it. Social cognitive theory would 
suggest that people are self-organizing, proactive, self-reflective, and self-regulatory agentic 
beings who can picture and move toward a desired future state (Bandura, 1999); that is, the 
“good society” can be defined and created. Societal good and moral behavior is more than 
adaptive traits interacting with the environment (Haidt, 2007), but can be created via reason-
based, moral guidelines and norms (Bandura, 1999) similar to philosophical work to build a 
theory of human rights (Sen, 2004).  
With respect to values, correspondence theories such as post-positivist empiricism at best 
describe what is, albeit metaphorically (Haig & Boresboom, 2012; Shadish et al., 2002); 
however, they provide little guidance to what should be. Coherence theories grounded in 
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philosophy such as Kant’s (1785/1993) Categorical Imperative, Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics (Crisp 
& Slote, 1997), or Talbott’s (2005) Moral Discovery offer a pathway for psychology to build 
logically-derived, consistent philosophical principles that provide prescriptive values for the 
discipline and its impact on society. The debate about the values that should drive psychology, 
however, should not simply be relegated to journals devoted to ethics. Rather, the debates should 
play a central role in a wide variety of psychological journals. Psychology has historically played 
this role in debates about human society (e.g., James, Freud, Skinner, Rogers, etc.). It is time for 
the discipline to play a central role again (such as debates about the underlying foundation for 
corporate social responsibility; Garriga & Melé, 2004). 
Conclusion 
 At the end of the day, so long as psychology hopes to be a legitimate scientific field that 
provides valuable contributions to society and furthers collective knowledge, theorists, 
researchers, and practitioners must be set on discovering reality as objectively as the human 
condition allows. The arguments put forth in this paper are aimed at this end. The intention is not 
to denigrate the unique perspective and contributions of social constructionism. Rather, the 
aforementioned arguments reveal a potential cost of the lure of relativism within social 
constructionism—the abandonment of the pursuit of truth and, consequently, the abandonment of 
a sustainable psychological science. Therefore, it is the conclusion of this paper that post-
positivism is the logically preferable philosophy of science for the future of psychology. 
Overall, the hope of this paper is for psychology to take the philosophical foundation upon which 
it rests more seriously, with a specific call to (re)consider the merit of post-positivism as a means 
for fueling the progress and development of valid, collective knowledge.  
IMPERFECTLY KNOWN OR SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED? 27 
References 
Ackerman, J. M., Shapiro, J. R., Neuberg, S. L., Kenrick, D. T., Becker, D. V., Griskevicius, V., 
Maner, J. K., & Schaller, M. (2006). They all look the same to me (unless they’re angry): 
From out-group homogeneity to out-group heterogeneity. Psychological Science, 17, 
836-840. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01790.x 
Alevesson, M., & Sköldberg, K. (2010). (Post-)positivism, social constructivism, critical realism: 
Three reference points in the philosophy of science. In Reflexive methodology: New 
vistas for qualitative research (pp. 15-52). London, UK: SAGE Publications LTD. 
Alvarez, B., Bonnet, J. L., & Kahn, M. (2014). Publish, not perish: Supporting graduate students 
as aspiring authors. Journal of Librarianship and Scholarly Communication, 2, 1-10. 
doi:10.7710/2162-3309.1141 
Anastas, J. W. (2004). Quality in qualitative evaluation: Issues and possible answers. Research 
on Social Work Practice, 14, 57-65. doi:10.1177/1049731503257870 
Anderson, M. S., Ronning, E. A., DeVries, R., & Martinson, B. C. (2010). Extending the 
Mertonian norms: Scientist’s subscription to norms of research. Journal of Higher 
Education, 81, 366-393. 
Aronson, E., Ellsworth, P., Carlsmith, J. M., & Gonzales, M. (1990). Methods of research in 
social psychology (2nd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.  
Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 3, 193-209. 
Basseches, M.  A. (1984). Dialectical thinking as a metasystemic form of cognitive organization. 
In M. L. Commons, F. A. Richards, & C. Armon (Eds.), Beyond formal operations: Late 
adolescent and adult cognitive development. New York, NY: Praeger. 
IMPERFECTLY KNOWN OR SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED? 28 
Berezow, A. B. (2012, July 13). Why psychology isn't science. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 
from http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/13/news/la-ol-blowback-pscyhology-science-
20120713 
Bones, A. K. (2012). We knew the future all along: Scientific hypothesizing is much more 
accurate than other forms of precognition—a satire in one part. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 7, 307-309. doi:10.1177/1745691612441216 
Cacioppo, J. T., Semin, G. R., & Berntson, G. G. (2004). Realism, instrumentalism, and 
scientific symbiosis: Psychological theory as a search for truth and the discovery of 
solutions. American Psychologist, 59, 214-223. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.59.4.214 
Çakir, M. (2012). Epistemological dialogue of validity: Building validity in educational and 
social research. Education, 132, 664-674. 
Campbell, D. T., & Fiske, D. W. (1959). Convergent and discriminant validation by the 
multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 56, 81-105. 
doi:10.1037/h0046016 
Cortina, J. M., & Folger, R. G. (1998). When is it acceptable to accept a null hypothesis: No way, 
Jose? Organizational Research Methods, 1, 334-350. doi:10.1177/109442819813004 
Crane, N. J., & Pearson, Z. (2011). Can we get a pub from this? Reflections on competition and 
the pressure to publish while in graduate school. The Geographical Bulletin, 52, 77-80. 
Crano, W. D., & Seyranian, V. (2009). How minorities prevail: The context/comparison-leniency 
contract model. Journal of Social Issues, 35, 335-363. doi:10.1111/j.1540-
4560.2009.01603.x 
Crisp, R., & Slote, M. (Eds.). (1997). Virtue ethics: Oxford readings in philosophy. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press.  
IMPERFECTLY KNOWN OR SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED? 29 
Croy, N. C. (2011). Prima scriptura: An introduction to New Testament interpretation. Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic. 
Descartes, R. (1983). Principles of philosophy. (V. R. Miller & R. P. Miller, Trans.). Boston, MA: 
Kluwer Boston. (Original work published 1647) 
Descartes, R. (1993). Meditations on first philosophy: In which the existence of God and the 
distinction of the soul from the body are demonstrated. (D. A. Cress, Trans.) Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett Publishing Company. (Original work published 1641) 
Descombe, M. (2008). Communities of practice: A research paradigm for the mixed methods 
approach. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 2, 270-283. 
doi:10.1177/1558689808316807 
Eagly, A. H., & Riger, S. (2014). Feminism and psychology: Critiques of methods and 
epistemology. American Psychologist, 69, 685-702. doi:10.1037/a0037372 
Feist, G. J., & Gorman, M. E. (Eds.) (2013). Handbook of the psychology of science. New York, 
NY: Springer Publishing Company. 
Fuchs, H. M., Jenny, M., & Fiedler, S. (2012). Psychologists are open to change, yet wary of 
rules. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 639-642. 
doi:10.1177/1745691612459521 
Garriga, E., & Melé, D. (2013). Corporate social responsibility theories: Mapping the territory. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 53, 51-71. 
Gergen, K. J. (1973). Social psychology as history. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 26, 309-320. doi:10.1037/h0034436 
Gergen, K. J. (2001). Psychological science in a postmodern context. American Psychologist, 56, 
803-813. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.56.10.803 
IMPERFECTLY KNOWN OR SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED? 30 
Gioia, D. A., Corley, K. G., Hamilton, A. L. (2012). Seeking qualitative rigor in inductive 
research: Notes on the Gioia methodology. Organizational Research Methods, 16, 15-31. 
Gorsuch, R. L. (1988). Psychology of religion. Annual Review of Psychology, 39, 201-221. 
Greenwald, A. G. (1975). Consequences of prejudice against the null hypothesis. Psychological 
Bulletin, 82, 1-20. doi:10.1037/h0076157 
Gringeri, C., Barusch, A., & Cambron, A. (2013). Examining foundations of qualitative research: 
A review of social work dissertations, 2008-2010. Journal of Social Work Education, 49, 
760-773. 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, and emerging 
confluence. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research 
(3rd ed., pp. 191-215). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Guo, S. (2015). Shaping social work science: What should quantitative researchers do? Research 
on Social Work Practice, 25, 370-381. doi:10.1177/1049731514527517 
Haidt, J. (2007). The new synthesis in moral psychology. Science, 316, 998-1002. 
Haig, B. D., & Borsboom, D. (2012). Truth, science, and psychology. Theory & Psychology, 22, 
272-289. doi:10.1177/0959354311430442 
Hansen, J. T. (2004). Thoughts on knowing: Epistemic implications of counseling practice. 
Journal of Counseling & Development, 82, 131-138. doi:10.1002/j.1556-
6678.2004.tb00294.x 
Hogg, M. A. (2010). Influence and leadership. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), 
Handbook of social psychology, volume 2 (5th ed., pp. 1166-1207). Hoboken, NJ: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
IMPERFECTLY KNOWN OR SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED? 31 
Hunt, S. D. (1994). On the rhetoric of qualitative methods: Toward historically informed 
argumentation in management inquiry. Journal of Management Inquiry, 3, 221-234. doi: 
10.1177/105649269433002 
Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and post-modernization: Cultural, economic and political 
change in 43 societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Jogalekar, A. (2013, August 13). Is psychology a “real” science? Does it really matter? [Blog 
post]. Retrieved from http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/the-curious-wavefunction/is-
psychology-a-e2809creale2809d-science-does-it-really-matter/ 
John, L. K., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2012). Measuring the prevalence of questionable 
research practices with incentives for truth telling. Psychological Science, 23, 524-532. 
doi:10.1177/0956797611430953 
Jost, J. T., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2002). The estrangement of social constructionism and 
experimental social psychology: History of the rift and prospects for reconciliation. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6, 168-187. 
Kant, I. (1993). Grounding for the metaphysics of morals: With on a supposed right to lie 
because of philanthropic concerns. (J. W. Ellington, Trans.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
Publishing Company. (Original work published 1785) 
Keith, N., & Frese, M. (2008). Effectiveness of error management training: a meta-analysis. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 93, 59-69. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.93.1.59 
Kitchener, K. S., & Brenner, H. G. (1990). Wisdom and reflective judgment: Knowing in the face 
of uncertainty. In R.J. Sternberg (Ed.), Wisdom: Its nature, origins, and development (pp. 
212-229). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
IMPERFECTLY KNOWN OR SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED? 32 
Klein, K. J., & Kozlowski, S. W. (2000). From micro to meso: Critical steps in conceptualizing 
and conducting multilevel research. Organizational Research Methods, 3, 211-236. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago, IL: The University 
of Chicago Press.  
Landis, R. S., Cortina, J. M., & Rogelberg, S. G. (n.d). Retrieved from 
http://www.springer.com/cda/content/document/cda_downloaddocument/JBP+RR+Speci
al+Issue+May+5RL.pdf?SGWID=0-0-45-1458040-p35536793 
Locke, E. A. (2002). The dead end of postmodernism. American Psychologist, 56, 458. 
doi:10.1037/0003-066X.57.6-7.458a 
Meyers, R. G. (1975). Truth and theory in philosophy: A post-positivist view. Philosophica, 15, 
21-38. 
Miller, A. N., Taylor, S. G., & Bedeian, A. G. (2011). Publish or perish: Academic life as 
management faculty live it. Career Development International, 16, 422-445. 
Myers, D., & Jeeves, M. A. (2003). Psychology: Through the eyes of faith. San Francisco, CA: 
Harper Collins. 
Neuliep, J. W., & Crandall, R. (1990) Editorial bias against replication research. Journal of 
Social Behavior and Personality, 5, 85-90. 
Neuliep, J. W., & Crandall, R. (1993) Reviewer bias against replication research. Journal of 
Social Behavior and Personality, 8, 21-29. 
Nosek, B. A., & Bar-Anan, Y. (2012) Scientific utopia: I. Opening scientific communication. 
Psychological Inquiry, 23, 217-243. doi:10.1080/1047840X.2012.692215 
Nosek, B. A., & Lakens, D. (2014). A method to increase the credibility of published results. 
Social Psychology, 45, 137-141. doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000192 
IMPERFECTLY KNOWN OR SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED? 33 
Nosek, B. A., Spies, J. R., & Motyl, M. (2012). Scientific utopia: II. Restructuring incentives and 
practices to promote truth over publishability. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 
615-631. 
Ostrom, T. M., & Sedikides, C. (1992). Out-group homogeneity effects in natural and minimal 
groups. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 536-552. doi:10.1177/1745691612459058 
Pilgrim, D. (2013). In defense of inclusive realism in psychology. The Psychologist, 26, 156-159. 
Ployhart, R. E., & Vandenberg, R. J. (2010). Longitudinal research: The theory, design, and 
analysis of change. Journal of Management, 36, 94-120. doi:10.1177/0149206309352110 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method 
biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended 
remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 879-903. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.88.5.879 
Ponterotto, J. G. (2005). Qualitative research in counseling psychology: A primer on research 
paradigms and philosophy of science. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 52, 126-136. 
doi:10.1037/0022-0167.52.2.126 
Popper, K. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc. 
Pronin, E., Gilovich, T., & Ross, L. (2004). Objectivity in the eye of the beholder: Divergent 
perceptions of bias in self versus others. Psychological Review, 111, 781-799. 
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.111.3.781 
Risen, J., & Apuzzo, M. (2014, December 14). C.I.A., on path to torture, chose haste over 
analysis. New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/politics/cia-on-path-to-torture-chose-haste-over-
analysis-.html 
IMPERFECTLY KNOWN OR SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED? 34 
Robins, R. W., Spranca, M. D., & Mendelsohn, G. A. (1996). The actor-observer effect revisited: 
Effects of individual differences and repeated social interactions on actor and observer 
attributions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 375-389. 
Schmitt, F. F. (1995). Truth: A primer. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Schwandt, T. A. (2000). Three epistemological stances for qualitative inquiry: Interpretivism, 
hermeneutics, and social constructionism. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), 
Handbook of qualitative research (2nd ed., pp. 189-213). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, Inc. 
Sen, A. (2004). Elements of a theory of human rights. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 32, 315-356. 
Shadish, W. R., Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (2002). Experimental and quasi-experimental 
designs for generalized causal inference. Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin. 
Sokal, A., & Bricmont, J. (1999). Fashionable nonsense: Postmodern intellectuals' abuse of 
science. New York, NY: Picador USA. 
Stroebe, W., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2012). Scientific misconduct and the myth of self-
correction in science. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 670-688. 
doi:10.1177/1745691612460687 
Talbott, W. J. (2005). What rights should be universal? Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Teece, D. J. (2007). Explicating dynamic capabilities: the nature and microfoundations of 
(sustainable) enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal, 28, 1319-1350. 
Van de Ven, A. H., & Sun, K. (2011). Breakdowns in implementing models of organization 
change. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 25(3), 58-74. 
doi:10.5465/AMP.2011.63886530 
IMPERFECTLY KNOWN OR SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED? 35 
Van Dyck, C., Frese, M., Baer, M., & Sonnentag, S. (2005). Organizational error management 
culture and its impact on performance: a two-study replication. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 90, 1228-1240. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.90.6.1228 
Walton, G. M. (2014). The new science of wise psychological interventions. Current Directions 
in Psychological Science, 23, 73-82. doi:10.1177/0963721413512856 
